The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in the number of foreclosures. The average length of time from the onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded dramatically. Although most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled them to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Thus, foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default, suggesting that improvement in credit card performance during the postcrisis period would likely be slowed by the removal of the temporary liquidity benefits as foreclosures reach completion.
I. Background and Research Objectives
The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep increase in the number of foreclosures. Foreclosure timelines -the length of time from the initial mortgage delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process -also expanded significantly, averaging up to three years in some states. This paper investigates whether these lengthened foreclosure timelines provided an income and liquidity benefit that households tapped into to improve their payment performance on nonmortgage consumer debt. The lengthening foreclosure timelines generated a substantial foreclosure backlog. Figure 1 shows the number of foreclosure starts annually from 2000 to 2012 along with the peak number of homes in foreclosure as observed monthly for each of these years. 3 The total number of U.S. foreclosure filings rose sharply beginning in 2007 and peaked in 2009, but the number of homes in the foreclosure pipeline continued to rise into 2010 and declined more slowly than did the number of filings, reflecting the extended foreclosure processes. 1 The term income benefit here refers to the standard income effect from a fall in commodity price. In effect, a household undergoing foreclosure and no longer making mortgage payments is facing a temporary decline in housing costs. 2 The states having a judicial foreclosure process are CT, DE, FL, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, ME, ND, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, VT, and WI. Foreclosure delays may provide a financial benefit to defaulted mortgage borrowers. While households are in the foreclosure pipeline, they typically are not making mortgage payments and have temporary relief from property taxes and some maintenance costs. 5 There are, however, potential costs associated with foreclosure delay. There may also be costs to neighborhoods because there are reduced incentives for households undergoing foreclosure to invest in maintenance.
This paper examines whether foreclosed borrowers with longer foreclosure timelines use the income and liquidity benefit to mitigate delinquency or pay down balances on nonmortgage household debt as opposed to simply ratcheting up consumption. As highlighted in several previous studies, such as Jagtiani and Lang (2011), the mortgage crisis period was characterized by changing priorities in consumer debt payments, such that households began to prioritize nonmortgage over mortgage debt when faced with difficulty in making some debt payments. The lengthened foreclosure timelines may have contributed to this changing prioritization. We are unaware of any prior research that investigates because of refiling. For example, foreclosure filing rates rose about 50 percent from 2011 to 2012 in New Jersey, Florida, Connecticut, and Indiana and by about 33 percent in Illinois and New York. 5 Although relief from housing payments adds to household liquidity, not making mortgage, property tax, and maintenance payments has costs. The borrower may need to put up a legal defense to maintain occupancy, in which case there may be legal expenses. Cordell et al. (2015) describe the added losses to lenders given foreclosure delays. Also, reduced maintenance may lead to unanticipated, unavoidable repair costs. Such costs may limit the impact of longer foreclosure timelines on the borrower's performance with credit card or other consumer debt. Specifically, we investigate how households undergoing foreclosure perform in repayment of credit card debt, which is of particular interest because card debt comprises about half of nonmortgage consumer debt during the period of study, the single largest category of such debt (Figure 2) . Moreover, the revolving nature of credit card debt, including relatively low minimum monthly payments, tends to make borrower repayment performance sensitive to marginal changes in borrower liquidity.
Source: Authors' calculations using merged data from the Black Knight Financial Services McDash and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax databases Our analysis indicates that households experiencing a longer foreclosure process are more likely to pay down their credit card debt and cure their delinquent cards (i.e., return to a current status). In other words, these households are more likely to improve their overall balance sheets than are households with shorter foreclosure timelines. Preliminary evidence of such a relationship is seen in the simple plot in Figure 3 , which shows payment performance on credit card debt before and after the start of a foreclosure process for mortgage borrowers experiencing a foreclosure, based on consumer credit records. The relationship is shown for foreclosures that occurred after the onset of the mortgage crisis in the third quarter of 2007 through the third quarter of 2012, a period that was characterized by lengthy foreclosure timelines and weak economic conditions. The plot shows, by month, the proportion of borrowers with a home in foreclosure who were delinquent (60 days or more past due) on at least one credit card, relative to the start date of the foreclosure process. That borrowers with delinquent mortgages were in overall financial distress is evident from the rising incidence of delinquency on credit cards in the months leading up to the foreclosure start date.
However, card delinquency declined after the initiation of foreclosure and as the time since foreclosure start lengthened, consistent with a liquidity benefit from mortgage payment relief during the foreclosure process. Moreover, as shown in The remainder of this paper more fully investigates the hypothesis that temporary relief from paying mortgage expenses may be used to mitigate delinquency on other consumer debt (specifically, credit card debt) or to pay down credit card balances. Our findings indicate that households do not consume all the benefits of temporary relief from housing expenses; instead, they use that temporary relief to cure delinquent credit card debt and reduce their credit card balances.
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Our empirical findings indicate that, first, longer foreclosure timelines are associated with a higher percentage of financially distressed mortgage borrowers curing their seriously delinquent credit card debt. Second, with longer foreclosure timelines, mortgage defaulters are better able to reduce their loan balance on credit cards. Third, we also find that longer timelines, which are associated with a larger amount of financial relief, are associated with a borrower's increased ability to remain current on credit card debt after the foreclosure ends.
II. Previous Research on Foreclosure Timelines
Previous studies have examined the causes of delays in the foreclosure process during the crisis period and have identified various factors, including the effects of varying regulations across states and 6 Our findings are consistent with work by Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone (1997) , who find that credit scores of consumers who foreclosed in the 1990s tend to recover after the foreclosure. Gerardi, Lambie-Hanson, and Willen (2013) examine the same states before and after the imposition of these laws, controlling for state effects and time trends. They find that in the short run, both the right-to-cure law and judicial foreclosure have a significant impact on extending foreclosure timelines. In particular, judicial intervention increases the number of persistent delinquencies, whereby borrowers in judicial foreclosure states are less likely to cure delinquent mortgage debt.
Pence (2006) examines the impact of foreclosure laws on availability of mortgage credit and finds that defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws are associated with a 4 percent to 6 percent decrease in mortgage loan size. This suggests that defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws reduce the supply of mortgage credit to borrowers at the time of loan origination. Similarly, lenders may respond to higher risks associated to foreclosure laws by charging higher interest rates, requiring larger down payments, or both, as documented by Jones (1993).
The foreclosure delays observed during the crisis period were also driven by problems of improper documentation associated with the huge volume of mortgages originated and securitized during the housing market boom and the unprecedented volume of foreclosures. Problems with mortgage documentation and mortgage processes resulted in many of the largest mortgage servicers instituting foreclosure moratoria in the fall of 2010 that lasted for several months, delaying mortgage foreclosures and increasing the backlog.
Allen, Peristiani, and Tang Our analysis further explores the link between foreclosure timelines and financial decisions by examining the impact of time in foreclosure on consumers' overall credit performance. We expect to observe that mortgage defaulters improved their credit performance (and reduced their financial distress) with other financial products during the rent-free (and mortgage payment-free) period and for some time thereafter.
8 There are also potential substantial costs associated with foreclosure delay. For example, Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen, and Yao (2015) find that lengthening foreclosure timelines have exacerbated the negative impact of mortgage distress and adversely impacted neighborhood home prices.
9 Zhu and Pace (2015) used loan-level data from Blackbox Logic's BBx database, which covers 90 percent of nonagency residential securitized deals, including prime, Alt-A, and subprime. 10 The impact of postdefault experience on the decision to default has been examined along several other dimensions. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) find that mortgage borrowers are less likely to default in recourse states (where mortgage lenders have the right to pursue a borrower's other assets if the property collateral is not sufficient to cover the mortgage amount), controlling for degree of negative equity. In addition, mortgage lenders were more likely to pursue alternatives to foreclosure in the recourse states. Mayer, Morrison, Piskorski, and Gupta (2014) and Jagtiani and Lang (2011) find that access to loan modification programs impacts the costs and benefits associated with mortgage delinquency and thereby influences default behavior. 
III. The Data

Analysis Data Sets.
Within the merged data set, we delineate three different subsamples for our analysis. The first is for the analysis of the likelihood of curing delinquent card debt during the 15 With this refinement, the match rate rises to 3.8 percent. 16 We did not include foreclosures before 2004 because the earlier data are less comprehensive. Also, we omitted foreclosures with start dates in 2013 or later because of the insufficient length of the observed performance period after the initiation of the foreclosure.
foreclosure period. The second is for the analysis of the change in card balances during the foreclosure period. The third is for the analysis of performance with credit card debt after foreclosure ends. Details are provided in the presentation of each respective empirical analysis.
The foreclosure period is defined as the entire period from the last interest payment date, which precedes the start of foreclosure (because lenders file for foreclosure only after multiple months of delinquency) to the end of the foreclosure process. A foreclosure process frequently terminates with legal ownership of the property transferred to the lender, at which point the loan is replaced as an asset on the balance sheet of the lender by the property that served as collateral, termed "real estate owned" or REO. However, the foreclosure process may terminate in other ways as well, such as by a property sale or liquidation that does not involve a transfer of ownership to the lender (such as short sale or third-party sale) or by cure of the delinquency and resumption of mortgage payments on the part of the borrower.
Thus, the foreclosure timeline as defined here includes the period of delinquency leading up to the lender's initial foreclosure filing plus the full time between the start and end of foreclosure, despite how the termination occurred. This timeline corresponds to the full period over which the borrower would be making no (or almost no) mortgage payments and consequently has improved liquidity.
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IV. Do Households Cure Their Delinquent Cards During Foreclosure?
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the relationship between time in foreclosure and the likelihood of curing a delinquent credit card. In this context, we restrict the sample to households that are seriously delinquent (60 days or more past due) on one or more credit card accounts as of the last mortgage interest payment date. Of the 292,577 individuals in the merged sample, 60,552 satisfy this criterion.
We then exclude from this sample all households in bankruptcy proceedings as of the last mortgage interest payment date. We do not include in our analysis delinquent cards that are in bankruptcy because the cure of those cards is likely to be a result of bankruptcy discharge rather than a consequence of the borrower prioritizing card repayment. This restriction leaves 55,854 individuals in the analysis sample.
Foreclosure Timeline and Control Variables. The foreclosure timeline for a mortgage subject to a foreclosure filing is defined as the number of months between the last mortgage interest payment date 18 The card cure and card balance change results reported in this paper are robust to using an alternative, narrower definition that equates the foreclosure timeline with the period between foreclosure start and end. 25 In particular, to the extent that the BAPCPA restricted the ability of some households to discharge their card debt through bankruptcy, post-BACPCA, a household may have been more inclined to prioritize card debt repayment over mortgage repayment, which may be reflected in an impact on card cure or paying down of card balances. Moreover, because the BAPCPA tightly limited the "automatic stays" of foreclosure proceedings that had typically 23 Various other explanatory variables were tested, including additional indicators for the type of mortgage (for example, adjustable rate, interest only); total number of open, nonmortgage credit accounts; ratio of mortgage payment to credit card balance; and local area house price appreciation. The results presented here and in the next two sections were not materially affected by including these variables, which were not statistically significant.
accompanied refiling of bankruptcy petitions, the BAPCPA may have had some impact on foreclosure timelines.
26
We estimate alternative specifications of the model with and without inclusion of these dummy variables. Inclusion of these dummy variables attempts to control period-specific changes in borrower behavior are not necessarily tied to expanded foreclosure timelines. However, because foreclosure timelines were systematically longer during the crisis and postcrisis periods, it may be difficult to separate the impact of the extended timelines from other period-specific factors.
Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 1 Empirical Results. As stated, our objective is to investigate the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrowers' ability to cure their nonmortgage debt. Specifically, for borrowers (outside of bankruptcy) with at least one credit card that is 60 or more days past due as of the initial mortgage delinquency date, we examine the relationship between the time in foreclosure and whether the credit card cures within six quarters of the initial mortgage delinquency date. 26 The BAPCPA's restrictions may have had an impact on the timelines of foreclosures that commenced some time before October 2005 by restricting a borrower's ability to refile for bankruptcy later on. Therefore, for the firststage, foreclosure timeline regression, we extend the BAPCPA period (set BAPCPA = 1) to include all of 2005.
27 Examples include invalid geography being reported in the data, missing risk score, and improperly reported mortgage origination date. 28 The remaining (pre-BAPCPA) portion of the precrisis period contains only 4 percent of the sample. When the BAPCPA period is extended to include all of 2005 (for the first-stage regression), the remaining portion of the precrisis period contains only 2 percent of the sample.
Borrower performance with card debt in relation to length of the foreclosure process may depend not only on the realized foreclosure timeline but also on the extent to which the timeline is anticipated at the outset. 29 If the borrower is aware from the outset that the foreclosure process will be lengthy, then the borrower may be more inclined to prioritize precommit to a strategy for repaying card debt. Thus, the anticipation of an extended timeline may lead to an ex-ante commitment to pay off card debt with the savings from the mortgage payment relief, such that debt repayment exhibits a weaker relationship to within-state variation in timelines across individuals.
Borrowers are likely to base their expectations of the typical length of the foreclosure process on information from news reports or on the experiences of neighbors or acquaintances. And since anticipated timelines are likely to be longer in judicial states compared with nonjudicial states, we estimate separate two-stage regression models for each grouping to account for this possibility.
Estimation results are presented in Table 2 . 30 Results in Table 2 are divided into two parts, corresponding to the first-and second-stage regression equations, and into four columns. The first two columns correspond to model specifications with and without the time period dummy variables, estimated with all states combined. The last two columns provide the results from the model (without period dummies) estimated separately for judicial and nonjudicial states.
The first-stage regression results presented in Table 2 determine the instrumented foreclosure timeline. The estimated coefficients relate the individual foreclosure timeline to the average timeline observed in the full LPS sample for similarly situated loans in foreclosure (in the same zip code with a similar loan amount and the same quarter of entry into foreclosure) and individual loan and borrower characteristics. The results suggest that larger origination amounts, older mortgage accounts, and subprime mortgages are associated with longer foreclosure timelines relative to the segment average timeline. The length of time in foreclosure tends to be shorter than the segment average for mortgages associated with some type of loss mitigation and borrowers with lower lagged credit scores.
The primary relationship of interest in Table 2 is the impact of the instrumented foreclosure timeline on the likelihood of credit card cure from the second-stage equation. The results indicate that a longer foreclosure timeline is associated with a higher probability of defaulted credit cards being cured.
The coefficient of Instrumented Individual Timeline is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 29 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this possibility and suggesting a distinction between judicial and nonjudicial states. The estimated coefficients on a timeline when estimated separately for judicial and nonjudicial states (Models 3 and 4) are larger than for the pooled sample (Model 1), suggesting that the relationship for the pooled sample is nonlinear because judicial states tend to have longer timelines. 31 The results overall are consistent with the hypothesis that the liquidity provided by longer foreclosure timelines was used to improve performance on other consumer credit.
Local economic factors are statistically significant, and as expected, the probability of cure is A higher credit score (Lagged Equifax Risk Score) is associated with a lower likelihood of cure, which seems counterintuitive. However, one plausible scenario is that an individual may have a relatively high risk score despite being behind on mortgage and card payments. This may be the case if the individual made an ex-ante choice to remain current on some active credit accounts and fall behind on others. Such ex-ante decisions may be reflected in relatively low cure rates on the accounts selected for delinquency.
The estimated coefficient on the loss mitigation indicator is positive and statistically significant, indicating that individuals with modified mortgages or mortgages associated with some type of loss mitigation are more likely to cure their delinquent cards. Thus, it appears that the reduced mortgage payments associated with loan modification helped some households cure not only their mortgage but also their delinquent credit card debt.
V. The Impact of Longer Foreclosure Timelines on Card Balances
Next, we turn our attention to the relationship between the time in foreclosure and the change in credit card balance. As in the cure-from-delinquency analysis, we analyze card payment performance over the six quarters following the last mortgage interest payment.
For this purpose, we restrict the sample to individuals with at least one active credit card account and a total card balance of at least $100 as of their last mortgage interest payment date, dropping a small number of outlier individuals whose card balances exceed $250,000. Of the 292,577 individuals in our merged sample, we retain 210,272 after applying these criteria.
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We then exclude from this sample all households in bankruptcy proceedings as of the last mortgage interest payment date or who those that file for bankruptcy within the subsequent six quarters. We do not include delinquent cards that are in bankruptcy in our analysis because any reduction of the balance on those cards could be a result of bankruptcy discharge rather than a consequence of the borrower prioritizing card repayment. This restriction leaves 187,739 individuals in the analysis sample.
For 23,938 of these individuals, the reporting of card balance terminates during the six-quarter period without any indication that the balance is paid off or that the individuals have filed for bankruptcy; that is, the balance goes from positive to missing. Because the six-quarter balance change for these individuals is unknown, we drop them from the analysis. As a robustness check, however, we Table 3 . The results again are divided into two parts, corresponding to the first-and second-stage regression equations, and four columns. Again, the first two columns correspond to model specifications with and without the time period dummy variables, estimated with all states combined, and the last two columns present results for the model (without period dummies) estimated separately for judicial and nonjudicial states.
The primary relationship of interest in Table 3 is the impact of an instrumented, individual foreclosure timeline on balance change in the second-stage equation. The coefficient of the instrumented timeline is negative and statistically significant in all four specifications, consistent with 34 We use STATA's IVREGRESS estimator.
longer foreclosure timelines enabling borrowers to reduce their credit card debt more quickly. 35 Similar to the relationships observed in the cure-from-delinquency analysis, we find a steeper relationship between the length of the foreclosure period and the rate of balance reduction in nonjudicial compared with judicial states (Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 ).
The results in Table 3 also indicate that card balance reduction is positively associated with mortgage loan modification, suggesting that the reduction in mortgage payments accompanying a modification enables a borrower to pay down card balances. Younger borrowers (younger than 25 years old) and subprime borrowers are less able to reduce their card balances given the same foreclosure timelines as other borrowers.
36 Whereas a higher county-level card delinquency rate exhibits an inverse relationship, a recent rise in the unemployment rate exhibits a positive relationship to balance change. This is consistent with conflicting effects of local economic trends -on one hand, a weaker local economy is associated with reduced household spending, whereas on the other hand, it may adversely impact an individual household's ability to pay down card debt. Finally, we note that the results reported in Table 3 are robust to again include individuals with unknown six-quarter balance change using their last reported balance to calculate their balance change.
Considered together, the results from Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with the notion that the liquidity benefit of a lengthened foreclosure timeline facilitates an improved credit position and balance sheet. Table 4 calculates the marginal effects of a longer foreclosure timeline, based on Models 1, 3, and 4 of Tables 2 and 3, on the probability of cure and on card balance. 37 The calculated marginal effects highlight the substantial impacts of expanding the timeline from a baseline of six months by successive six-month increments.
For instance, the probability of curing a delinquent card within six quarters, based on Model 1 of 36 Similar results are obtained using a one-stage ordinary least squares regression with a segment-average foreclosure timeline as the instrument for an individual timeline, with or without county-fixed effects added to the regression equation. 37 We calculate marginal effects at representative values by applying our estimated models to all individuals replacing the instrumented timeline with 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, and 36 months and then averaging the estimated cure rates and balance changes across individuals. We then subtract the mean of estimated balance change or cure rate at six months from the mean for a longer timeline to show the change relative to the six-month baseline.
months to three years. The decline in average card balance, based on Model 1 of Table 3 , is about $3,000 over the six quarters as the foreclosure timeline lengthens from six months to three years.
VI. What Happens After the Foreclosure Ends?
The finding of an association between the time in foreclosure and the likelihood of curing delinquent cards suggests that households in foreclosure tend to use their temporary mortgage payment relief to improve their credit card payment performance. Once the foreclosure process ends, this liquidity benefit can be expected to dissipate. We now explore the question of whether longerlasting foreclosure periods have longer-lasting liquidity benefit, as reflected in reduced probability of card delinquency after the foreclosure ends. To further investigate the ex-post credit card repayment performance of households that have been through a foreclosure process, we first restrict our sample to individuals for whom the foreclosure process ended by the second quarter of 2013 to allow six quarters of observed performance after the foreclosure ends. Of the 292,577 individuals in our merged sample, 276,295 meet this criterion.
We then restrict the sample to individuals who, as of the foreclosure end date, have at least one credit card and for whom no card is 60 days or more past due. After this restriction, 132,371 individuals remain in the sample. Finally, we exclude individuals in bankruptcy proceedings as of the foreclosure end date, leaving a sample of 123,610 individuals.
The same two-equation, instrumental variables approach used for the cure-from-delinquency analysis is used here. Specifically, we use the same first-stage linear regression model for loan-level foreclosure timelines along with a second-stage probit model for card delinquency six quarters beyond the foreclosure end date. These equations are jointly estimated via maximum likelihood.
We define the dependent variable of the stage-two regression to be a binary variable indicating whether the borrower is 60 days or more past due on at least one credit card six quarters after the foreclosure end date. It takes a value of 1 if the borrower is delinquent and 0 if otherwise. We update three control variables used in the previous, two-stage regression equations to be measured as of the foreclosure end date: County Rate Card 60+ DPD, Unemployment from -15 to -3
Months, and Number of Cards. Otherwise, we include the various loan and borrower characteristics used previously with the same timing of measurement.
38
We estimate two alternative specifications with this set of explanatory variables: without and with inclusion of the crisis and postcrisis period dummy variables. Also, we estimate the equation without period dummies, adding an indicator for foreclosures that end in cure or payoff. The latter (potentially endogenous) variable controls for the possibility that shorter foreclosure timelines may be associated with foreclosures that end in cure or payoff, which in turn may be associated with more favorable local economic conditions that also reduce the incidence of card delinquency.
Summary statistics of the data are presented in panel C of Table 1 Empirical Results. The results are presented in Table 5 . The estimated coefficient of the instrumented foreclosure timeline is negative and statistically signficant in all three specfications. Thus, longer timelines, which are associated with a larger amount of financial relief, are associated with a greater ability to remain current on credit card debt after the foreclosure ends.
One caveat here is that a longer foreclosure timeline implies a longer interval between the financial stress event triggering the initial mortgage delinquency and the start of the performance observation period (as of foreclosure end), and this longer temporal gap may explain the better performance outcome following foreclosure end. Because we have restricted the sample to borrowers with no delinquent credit cards as of foreclosure end and we control for the borrower's credit score as of foreclosure end, we find this alternative explanation to be less compelling, although we cannot rule it out.
The estimated coefficients of the control variables are as expected. Borrowers with a larger number of credit cards and lower credit scores are more likely to become delinquent on at least one card after the foreclosure ends. Borrowers who previously had jumbo mortgages are more likely to 38 We drop Dummy Card 60+ DPD 12 Months Prior, which is not relevant in the context of this population that consists entirely of individuals emerging from a period of financial stress.
become delinquent on a card subsequent to the end of the foreclosure, which mirrors the finding that jumbo mortgage borrowers were more likely to cure card delinquency while in foreclosure. Weaker local economic conditions as indicated by the county-level card delinquency rate as of the initial mortgage delinquency date are positively associated with the likelihood of card delinquency subsequent to foreclosure end.
Rising county-level unemployment in the year prior to the initial mortgage delinquency date is inversely associated with the likelihood of card delinquency subsequent to foreclosure end. An intuitive interpretation is that the restriction of the sample to individuals who are current on their credit card payments as of foreclosure end leads to a selection effect whereby households that had been subject to a local unemployment shock are more financially resilient.
From Models 1 and 2 of Table 5 , borrowers whose mortgages were modified are less likely to become delinquent on their cards after the end of foreclosure. In Model 3, we observe an inverse relation between the foreclosure ending in cure or payoff and the likelihood of a household becoming delinquent after the end of foreclosure, consistent with both outcomes being expected as a result of improvement in a household's financial condition.
VII. Conclusions
Borrowers in default on their mortgages receive a temporary benefit from reduced housing expenses as they continue to live in their homes without making any mortgage or rental payments. With the foreclosure timeline lengthening in recent years, this benefit has been expanding. Do households use this temporary benefit to maintain consumption levels, or do they use the benefit to improve their balance sheets and improve their credit performance on nonmortgage debt? We have examined the impact of time in foreclosure on credit card repayment performance to address this question.
Our findings support the hypothesis that households in default on their mortgages take advantage of lower housing expenses to improve their balance sheets as foreclosure timelines expand.
Longer foreclosure timelines are associated with an increased likelihood of cure of delinquent credit card debt and reduced card balances. Longer foreclosure timelines also have a longer-lasting benefit subsequent to the end of the foreclosure period, reflected in lower ex-post delinquency on credit card debt.
Thus, our findings indicate that households do not consume all the benefits from a temporary relief from housing expenses; instead, they use that temporary relief to cure delinquent credit card debt and reduce their credit card balances. Interestingly, we find that payment relief from loan modifications has a similar impact to payment relief from longer foreclosure timelines: Both are associated with curing card delinquency and reducing card balances during the foreclosure process and reducing the likelihood of delinquency after the end of foreclosure.
Although the recent recession provides an ideal representation of a severe stress for credit performance on mortgage loans, it may be less ideally representative for credit card performance.
Credit card default has not been as severe as mortgage defaults during the financial crisis, partly because of the savings to consumers from housing expense relief that has allowed them to improve their credit card debt performance. Conversely, improving credit card (or other nonmortgage consumer credit) performance during the postcrisis period may be slowed by the removal of the temporary liquidity benefits as foreclosures in process reach completion and the foreclosure backlog clears. The dependent variable is the probability of curing a card delinquency -at least one card that is 60 days or more past due on at least one card as of the last mortgage interest payment date becomes current during the subsequent six quarters. The sample is limited to individuals with at least one delinquent credit card as of the last mortgage interest payment date. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on pooled geographies. Models 3 and 4 separate the sample into judicial and non-judicial states, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered at the county level) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the change in combined credit card balance over the six quarters following the last mortgage interest payment date; see equations 1 and 2. The sample is limited to individuals with total card balances of at least $100. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on pooled geographies. Models 3 and 4 separate the sample into judicial and nonjudicial states, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered at the county level) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Independent Variables
Model 1 The numbers below are marginal effects calculated from the coefficients of instrumented individual timeline estimated in Stage 2 of the regression, as presented in Table 2 , column 1 (for Card Cured) and in Table 3 , column 1 (for Card Balance Decreased). These numbers summarize the relationship between the foreclosure timeline and likelihood of curing a delinquent card and the relationship between the foreclosure timeline and the amount of card balance change. The dependent variable is a binary indicator distinguishing individuals (initially current on all their cards) who became 60 days or more past due on at least one credit card six quarters following the foreclosure end date. The sample is limited to individuals with at least one credit card and all of their credit cards current as of the foreclosure end date. Robust standard errors (clustered at the county level) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
